The sad state of Kashmir

This article has been published at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1246318/sad-state-kashmir/

Just after Partition, the Pakistani state claimed the complete Kashmir as its legitimate territory
which should be certified by a plebiscite by the Kashmiri people based on the fact that majority
of its inhabitants are Muslims. “Kashmir humari sha ragh hay” is the major slogan sung by
Pakistanis and the claim that the letter “K” in Pakistan is for Kashmir.

On the contrary, in 1963, the Pakistani side under Field Marshal General Ayub Khan announced giving Kashmir’s 13,000 square miles land to China on Kashmir’s border with the Chinese region of Xinjiang. It means we were ready to give some part of our vital land as gift to China. Then in 1972, PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto accepted the Line of Control (LOC) as an almost official border and in 2006, president General (retd) Pervez Musharraf gave a proposal which included two major points. Firstly, borders between Pakistan and India remain the same and secondly, Kashmir be given autonomy but not independence. These chronological events clearly show that Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir has been going back slowly and steadily. This means that the “sha rag” is no longer considered as such
practically but only remains so in speeches and slogans. The people of Kashmir on the Indian side have not accepted Indian domination even after more than 68 years. Interestingly, India has millions of Muslims living peacefully in other parts of India but continuous wave of revolts and protests against the Indian regime can be seen in Kashmir. Either it is because of the continuous and deliberate interference of Pakistan in Kashmir or the brutal and inhumane behaviour of the Indian regime which includes pallet guns, disappearances, extra judicial murders etc., or maybe it is because of the nature of the people of Kashmir to not bow down against injustice and stand for their freedom.

Whatever may be the case, the Kashmir issue should have been properly handled rather than going again and again on the negotiating table when things get hot on the roads of Kashmir and betraying the hopes of the people by slowly stepping back from the initial claims. As far as the UN resolutions are concerned, which is the prime route Pakistan intends to take to resolve the conflict, it seems that since the UN has failed miserably for the last 68 years, expecting it to intervene and resolve the issue ahead is nothing but self-deception. It can be safely stated without any exaggeration that UN has been an absolutely useless platform when it comes to issues related to the Muslim world which include nations like Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, chachnya, Syria, Libya etc.

Similarly, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has always discussed this issue but never taken any practical steps for its resolution. It could have become a strong force in dealing with resolving conflicts of the Muslim world by using its massive influence. But it chose to remain an incapable platform. Now then, with negotiations, we are losing Kashmir, the UN and OIC are not doing anything about it. We have also tried small military operations like Gibraltor and Kargil and have failed in them miserably because of lack of political will.

Having said that, it seems that in order to seriously liberate Indian occupied Kashmir, a sound political and military strategy is required with a sincere and determined will. Secondly, any demotivating claims like “India and Pakistan are both nuclear states and therefore we cannot do much about military solution with India” are outcomes of a politically weak mindset. Have we not seen two nuclear superpowers in cold war where America came out triumphed? Secondly, have we not seen how India took out Bangladesh from Pakistan? Why is it not possible then with a serious visionary leadership to turn the tide of history?

The question would still remain, What if we do get the Indian occupied Kashmir, can the current Pakistani regime yield to the demands of the Kashmiri people? The Pakistani regime is already responsible for massive atrocities on its own people in places like Balochistan, Fata region, Karachi etc. Will the people of Kashmir really accept such an attitude from Pakistan? Or would they then demand independence and would be dealt with the same fate as that of the people of Bangladesh?

And finally, let us assume, we give up the “sha rag” and India gives up the “Atoot Ang” and both nations decide to let Kashmir become an independent state. Would that be really good for the Kashmiris or would they become colony of either India or Pakistan or china because of inability to take a firm stance in front of these giant neighbours? Consequently, it means that an independent Kashmir would also not prosper much, would remain in turmoil and therefore will not be in a position to make its own destiny.

Why are non-militant Islamists being criminalized under the Cybercrime Bill 2016?

This article has been published at
http://nation.com.pk/blogs/08-Sep-2016/why-are-non-militant-islamists-being-criminalized-by-the-cybercrime-bill-2016

After reading the 21 page, recently approved, Cybercrime Bill, and keeping in mind the changing dynamics of social media and the internet, one can clearly ascertain that several crimes related to unauthorized use of identity or access of information, offence against dignity and modesty of a person, child pornography, glorification of an offence, cyberterrorism and the likes, required a necessary and much needed legislation.

However, what is equally important is the way this legislation is worded and if it does not consider the human and social aspects in the proper context, the sole purpose of this legislation might be counterproductive.

For instance, Farieha Aziz, Director of Bolo Bhi which is an advocacy forum for digital rights, criticized Section 34 of the recently passed bill and said:

“In an environment where there is zero tolerance for anything that is a departure from the official narrative, how else is Section 34 going to be used if not to stifle already dying freedoms and the space to voice a dissenting view? Raise questions about the ongoing military operations, and you’re running down the army as an institution; talk about judicial over­reach and it becomes a matter of the judi­ciary’s reputa­tion; take a politician or political party to task and it becomes an attack on demo­cracy itself; critique of indivi­duals has be­come synonymous with critique of an institution and cons­tructive criticism poi­n­ting towards much-needed reforms within our institutions is now equivalent to defamation.”

Several other writers have also criticized certain draconian aspects of the bill, and termed the whole exercise as an attempt to amplify the state’s thirst for absolute power over anything that exposes its wrongdoing or calls for accountability and transparency into the workings of state institutions.

On the other hand, Section 10 of the bill, which discusses cyberterrorism, has been generally accepted and its loopholes not actively criticized by the civil society. The points in this section regarding hate speech, sense of fear, planning and funding terrorism are commendable but Section 10(c) can be extremely exploitative especially against non-militant Islamists because of its vague language. It criminalizes those who “advance the objectives of organizations or individuals or groups proscribed under the law.” Now this fancy statement has some serious repercussions.

The internationally accepted definition of terrorism is “Islamist motivated militancy by non-state actors” and the groups proscribed under the law on charges of terrorism include TTP, ISIS, Al-Qaida, SSP etc. Ironically, since such groups are Islamist motivated therefore their objectives contain ideas, which can arguably be traced back to the teachings of Islam.

For instance, ideas like the establishment of a caliphate, liberation of Muslim lands, jihad, establishment of Islamic judiciary, anti-democracy, anti-capitalism, anti-interest based banking system, anti-American dictation, etc. These objectives and the likes are carried and propagated by several Islamist groups. For instance, all political Islamists like JI, JUI, JUP, TI, etc and all religious Islamists like Tableeghi Jamat, Al-Huda, Madariss, Dawat-e-Islami etc. who are neither proscribed nor militant, but do share the beliefs of establishing an Islamic form of governance, economics, judiciary etc. can be penalized under this section.

This means that if I consider the governance model of the rightly guided caliphs and the caliphate to be the political solution for Pakistan, I consider Islamic judicial model as the best model, I consider interest based banking and capitalist economic model a menace to our society, I consider zakat and jizya to be a prudent taxation policy and do not consider American dictation vital for us, then I am “advancing the objectives of a group proscribed under the law”.

Since the proscribed organizations hold these very beliefs, I cannot express my own similar beliefs and if I do so, I can be jailed for “advancing an objective of a proscribed organization” even though I could be condemning their brutal acts in the severest of words, and propose a peaceful non-violent course for the attainment of Islamist objectives.

This section of the Cybercrime Bill comes with dangerous consequences because Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim society and these non-militant Islamists are an active component of our society. Amongst them are those who are democratic, political, intellectual, revolutionary and preachers of non-militant thought. Doctors, engineers, scientists, educationalists, businessmen etc. all can be individuals with belief systems that lean towards Islamism. This section would give the state and security agencies unprecedented access to criminalize anyone and everyone who intends to propagate the political, social, judicial or economic systems of Islam.

Suppose for a moment, that a democratic party turns violent and gets proscribed by the law, will the proponents of democracy and secularism be criminalized because a proscribed organization also believes in those ideals?

The views held by believers of political Islam can overlap with thoughts of militant proscribed organizations like TTP or the likes. Criminalizing them seems to be a deliberate effort to marginalize the Islamist ideology residing in our society.  

 To sum it up, the Cybercrime Bill had some much needed legislative rules mixed with some highly inappropriate ones so as to give it a neutral cover and get it through the NA and the Senate. The criticism had been directed on the vague sections of the bill, which were blatantly ignored by the legislators. This clearly highlights that the core intention of this legislation was to create a sinister atmosphere and trigger a feeling of oppressive malevolence in the general masses.  

Quetta: Where hospitality has no bounds

This article has been published with some changes at
http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/34913/quetta-where-hospitality-has-no-bounds/

When I received an invitation from the University of  Balochistan informing me that five of our engineering projects had been accepted for the first Invention to Innovation Summit – the first comment my director made was,

 “Umair, do you know the halaat (conditions) in Quetta? Taking students there can be risky!”

It wasn’t easy trying to make him understand that all universities from Sindh and Balochistan were participating; hence it was mandatory for us to attend. However, we were finally able to convince him.

There were nine of us, out of which seven were visiting Quetta for the first time. Ultimately, this resulted in a fear of the unknown, mixed with a desire to meet new people. However, what we witnessed during our three days there totally changed our perspective of Quetta.

We reached Quetta early in the morning, and a local student’s father greeted us at the bus stand. He arranged for our transport to the hotel, which was near Liaquat bazaar. Once we reached our hotel, we freshened up and made our way to the University of Balochistan.

On our way to the University, the first thing we noticed about Quetta was the fact that it was built between mountains. The second thing we noticed was that Frontier Corps (FC) troops were stationed on every road. Even though the large presence of Law Enforcement Agents (LEA) painted a grim picture of the city’s security, it created a sense of safety and decreased the possibility of threats.

Upon reaching the University, we unpacked our projects, set up our booth and were ready to present.

The first thing that used to come to mind when I thought of Balochistan was the backwardness of the community and its people. However, much to my surprise, the University of Balochistan is just as lively as the University of Karachi. The students, their political parties, and faculty are of the same calibre.

I noticed that the students of Karachi and Balochistan were visibly different in terms of physique. I am a slim person, and I couldn’t find anyone that even remotely resembled my physique. The students proudly wore their kameez with ghair wali shalwar (flowy shalwar). A person can deduce the stature of the other through their style, which was what we did.

I was also amazed to see many students wearing Sindhi topis. Upon further inquiry, I discovered that there is a very small difference between Sindhi, Pakhtun and Balochi topis. For mere laymen like my team, we were completely unqualified to determine the difference.

I almost missed the turban which I thought was related to the Pakhtun or Baloch culture. It is in fact a modified version of the Sindhi topi, which is worn in Quetta by Balochis and Pakhtuns.

Various female students on campus also had a unique style of dressing; they covered their face with their dupattas, but had exceptionally decorated their eyes, so much so that one couldn’t help but glance at them.

The common perception about females in this province is that they are very religious, cover their faces and have strict segregation rules. Though this does not stem from religious ideas, rather it seemed to be a matter of Baloch or Pakhtun customs. I only came across a handful of female students in abayas.

Before getting on the bus to Quetta, I had called one of my former students, who belonged to Quetta, hoping to meet up with him. Unfortunately he was in Lahore at the time. Regardless, this is where my fascination with the people of Quetta began. My student insisted that I stay at his house, and he would arrange my transport along with everything else.

When we did reach Quetta, I received a phone call from a man who introduced himself as the chachu (paternal uncle) of my former student. He asked me if I had reached safely, inquired about my accommodation and insisted that I have dinner with him.

“Aap humaray mehmaan hain, baghair khana khaye aap nahi ja saktay”.

(You are our guest; you cannot leave without eating food).

Another facet that I saw was the students’ awareness when it comes to politics. At a question and answer session, one student asked a tough question, and in response his fellow classmates applauded him. He asked,

“If the gold of Reko Diq and the natural gas of Sui could not change the life of a citizen of Balochistan, what can we expect from a road of China Pakistan Economic Corridor? Will it be dealt amongst the Nawabs, the Sardars, the politicians and the generals?”

Several other interesting questions were raised; however the answers from the government representatives were disappointing. It seemed, yet again, that the Gwadar port of Balochistan might not change the fate of the ordinary people.

As the day came to an end, we packed up and were ready to head back to our hotel. But our plans changed as we had to drop a local student to her house on Alamdar road.

Alamdar Road was home to the Shia Hazara community and housed an FC check post, who did not allow anyone inside the premises unless their ID cards were handed over. This security measure was implemented after a recent bomb blast on the Hazara procession where hundreds of Hazara Shia’s were killed. The family members of the deceased refused to bury the deceased until proper security was provided to them.

All along the road, pictures of the deceased were displayed. I asked our Baloch driver about the mix of Shias and Sunnis in Quetta, and he categorically said that there are no Shias in Balochistan, there are no Shias in the Pakhtun area of Quetta and the Hazaras residing there are from Iran. This was also certified by the fact that there is an Iranian embassy in Quetta along with Afghan embassy. Quetta’s political importance can be understood by the fact that its reach is as far as Iran and Afghanistan.

The faculty was invited for a networking dinner at the Quetta Club, located in the Cantonment area (Cantt). I did not avail the pick and drop service organised for me and instead went around the city in a rickshaw before making heading towards dinner.

The roads in Quetta are very narrow and during rush hour all roads are usually jam packed. Another thing I noticed was the vast difference between the vehicles present at a given time – while some are on bikes and cycles, others are driving around in Land cruisers and Pajeros. This illustrates the large-scale disparity in wealth distribution and a dearth of middle class citizens in the region.

I asked the rickshaw driver about the situation of Quetta and he said,

“It has gotten much better because of the FC’s strong presence, but it’s temporary.”

I was astounded that he did not take advantage of me being a tourist and charged me an honest amount for the distance we had travelled. In cities like Lahore and Karachi, taxi/rickshaw drivers tend to rob you by overcharging, even if you’re a local.

He left me at the Jinnah check post in the Cantt area and I walked the rest of the way. Only stickered rickshaws were allowed inside. I had suffered a toe injury so I walked rather slowly. It took me about two minutes to get to the reception area.

I told them that I had to go to Quetta Club, but was informed that I was at the wrong check post; I needed to go to the China check post instead. The receptionist said that it was a 10 minute walk, but because I had an injured toe, I decided to take another rickshaw to the next check post. I stopped another rickshaw who quoted Rs30 for the short ride. I had a Rs1,000 note and neither of us had any change. It was around 10pm at night so there weren’t many rickshaws coming my way either. I made the obvious decision and started limping ahead. The rickshaw driver saw me and said,

“Aap ko waisay hi choor deta hun, aap humaray Karachi kay mehmaan hain.”

(You are our guest from Karachi; I’ll drop you free of cost).

He dropped me at the check post without taking any money. My admiration for the people of Quetta tripled after this. In Lahore, just mentioning that you are visiting from Karachi can get you into trouble, however in Quetta, you are treated with respect.

During dinner at the Quetta Club, I met the main organiser of the event, Dr Waheed, who was a friend of the Head of Department of Electrical Engineering Program at our University. He was extremely happy to hear that someone from Karachi had participated.

In the closing ceremony of the second day, with an auditorium filled with students and teachers of various universities of Balochistan, coupled with industrialists, Dr Waheed specially thanked us for coming from Karachi, and gave us a special shield for participating in the summit.

During the networking dinner, I came across a Physics professor from the University of Balochistan, who happened to be a classmate of our head of department during his PhD studies. He too was thrilled to hear that we were from Karachi and took me in his own car to drop me to the hotel, even though it was quite far from his own house. I was continuously impressed by the hospitality of these people.

I came back at around midnight and sat with my students for a cup of tea while sharing my experience. They had similar stories to tell as they, too, had been roaming around in the bazaar and exploring Quetta. They said that their attire made it obvious to the shop keepers that they were from Karachi, and kept insisting that we have a cup of tea with them. They also spoke of the instance where they were finding this particular, popular place to eat and asked a policeman for directions – who was kind enough to offer taking them there in his van.

The next day, we were better organised. We reached the university early, set up our booth and impressed many with our engineering projects. I also visited other booths which were set up by other engineering universities like Mehran University, University of Khuzdar, and University of Turbat. Along with The Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Sciences (BUITEMS), we displayed our electrical related projects.

We had our event that evening, so I politely asked my former students uncle to meet for lunch the next day instead. I was overwhelmed by the hospitality that almost everyone from the region exuded. Later, my student’s uncle visited the University of Balochistan, and brought Kabuli Pulao (a famous rice dish in Quetta) with him along with a packet of dry fruit. He kept insisting on taking us all out for dinner, but we had already accepted another dinner invitation.

The first day was busy; there were various sessions organised and one of the sessions that I attended was of personal interest to me; it was about the CPEC and its effects on Balochistan.

Various myths about Balochistan had been completely debunked in one day. When I visited the projects displayed by BUITEMS, I was astonished by their effort and their level of skill. I had assumed that they would be of a lower calibre or have lower technological standards than our projects, but I can safely claim that their projects levelled, if not surpassed ours.

I heard that BUITEMS has made a serious mark in the technological front and I finally witnessed their achievements. When I asked about the secret to their success, someone remarked that admissions are purely based on merit, and even the son of a governor would be denied admission at the institution if he did not meet their criteria.

During the exhibition of our projects, a bunch of jolly Psychology students came to our stall. We were dressed in pants and shirts – hence were standing out. They tried to understand the engineering projects but eventually gave up and offered us tea, and once again, made the friendly request which was,

“Aap humaray mehmaan hain.. jaanay say pehlay humaray saath chai zaroor peeni hay aap nay.”

(You are our guest; you have to have tea with us before you leave).

I couldn’t say no, and we went out to have tea. I asked them if they had ever visited Karachi and they said they have and stayed in Lyari. Another student from Khuzdar University who was staying in the same hotel as us was also from Lyari, and I found that generally the Baloch from Quetta hold strong connections to Karachi via Lyari, while Pakhtuns hold strong connections from Al Asif and Kati Pahari.

Another group of students came and one of them gave me his cell phone number and said,

“Kissi bhi qisim main Quetta main zaroorat ho ya pareshani ho aap humain call karna.” 

(If you ever need anything or need any help in Quetta, please call me).

We already had the Kabuli pulao for lunch with my former student’s chachu, and the organisers gave us coupons for three biryanis. When the students went to the counter to get the three biryanis, they complained that there are nine people from Karachi. Without any hesitation, the man working at the counter put aside all his calculations, took out nine biryanis and said,

“Aap humaray mehman hain, kam hojayay to batayayiyeaga.” 

(You are our guest, if these run out, let me know).

The summit came to an end in the evening and we returned to our hotel. Another student’s father, who had worked here, had arranged a van for us through his friend so we could go to Labelli, a restaurant just outside Quetta.

Being a Karachiite, I have tried sajji at many different places in Karachi but never really liked the dish. But when one tastes the sajji in Quetta, they will forget the sajji of Karachi!

Another interesting aspect of Quetta was the elegant display of roses, not just in the university, but all over the city as well. I don’t know why Quetta isn’t famous for its variety of roses because, for us, they were the most unique feature of Quetta.

On the third day we decided to visit Ziarat. We went out early in the morning; the father of a local student came with us. Her mother had been kind enough to prepare some deliciouschicken karhai and kebabs to eat there.

Ziarat is about three hours from Quetta, but those three hours were filled with breath-taking sights. The first thing you notice are the mountains, which are initially very far, but as you keep driving towards Ziarat, they get closer and closer. The landscape is exceptionally beautiful. My students, selfie-maniacs, stopped the car at several points to take pictures.

Upon reaching Ziarat, which is enclosed by mountains, we went to the Quaid-e-Azam residency which has been refurbished. It was selected as a health resort by the British in 1891 and they earned around Rs38,000 in one year by promoting tourism in this beautiful place.

I fail to understand why tourism isn’t being developed in such a beautiful place. There are hundreds of spots in Ziarat which can easily attract domestic and international tourism if proper guest houses, resorts, camping trips and basic mountain climbing facilities are set up.

The name Ziarat was given to this area because of the Mazar (mausoleum) of Mulla Tahir, also known as Baba Kharwari. Hanna Lake, present in Ziarat, is also an exceptional spot for tourism; however it is not being exploited for commercial use either.

After the adventurous experience, we returned to the bus stand from where we had to head back to Karachi. Our visit had truly changed our views of Quetta and its exceptional people, along with the beauty of its nearby areas.

It is our governing bodies’ political mistake that has given it a negative reputation and created havoc in such a rich and cultural society.

Erdogan Islamist deception

This article has been published with some changes at
http://nation.com.pk/blogs/27-Aug-2016/contrary-to-popular-opinion-erdogan-is-not-an-islamist

The Turkish president is not against secularism, but assertive secularism in Turkey

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the powerful ruler of Turkey, is considered an Islamist by many. Evidences to support this perception include his explicit use of Islamist jargon in his speeches, his past as an Islamist activist, his wife wearing a scarf, his reaction on the Gaza issue, his attempt to introduce some form of ban on alcohol. On the contrary, however, it can also be argued that Mr. Erdegon is a politician who understands how Islamist rhetoric or seemingly Islamist actions can be used to garner mass public support. At the same time, he knows how Islamist ideas must be sidelined to ensure the status quo and the secular nature of Turkey.

To make a factual analysis on the Erdogan Turkish model and its ideological leanings, an understanding of the difference between an Islamist model and a secular model is necessary. In fact, a further classification of the secular model into a soft/conservative secular model i.e. British/Canadian model and a hard secular model i.e. Kamal Ataturk/French model might be required.

An Islamist model considers the Muslim Ummah its citizens and is mostly anti-national with an expansionist foreign policy; Sharia law rather than man-made laws are the basis of its social, economic, judicial, educational and political systems. Minorities are given rights to follow their own religion but they are also bound by Sharia law in matters of economics, judiciary, social, education and political systems. 

Keeping this perspective in mind, we see that AKP has no intentions to make Turkey an Islamist model because in several speeches made in 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan clearly stated: 

"We are not an Islamic party, and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat."
Former minister Hüseyin Çelik said:

"The AK Party is a conservative democratic party. The AK Party's conservatism is limited to moral and social issues."

This was also echoed by Erdoğan that AK Party's agenda is limited to "Conservative democracy" and he recommended secularism for Egypt when the Islamist party Ikhwan came to power.

If we extend the AK party’s conservatism, it seems that they are discussing political conservatism based on moral and social values derived from Islam. There are several political parties in Europe, America and elsewhere in the world who stand for religious conservative principles in their politics. Conservative values are grounded in religious beliefs and principally seek to apply the teachings of their particular religion on politics and society, sometimes by merely proclaiming the value of those teachings, at other times by having those teachings influence laws. Religious conservatism typically opposes abortion, homosexuality, drug use, and premarital sex.

The important point however is these parties are secular in nature and not Christian or Islamist. They firmly believe that any change in the fabric of society is the sole authority of the people and their course of action for any change in law is through the will of the people i.e. Democracy.

AKP upholds its secular identity by limiting its religious conservatism to social aspects only which would rarely jump into matters related to economic, judicial, political and foreign affairs. The Turkish government announced in a statement that AKP had abandoned plans to join the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and has instead joined on 12th November, 2013, the European Conservatives and Reformists political family. This announcement further confirms the secular nature of AKP but this secularism is of a soft/conservative nature.

An Islamist outlook is however different from the religious conservative outlook. An Islamist considers Islam and the Holy Quran as the sole derivative of the state's constitution.

For instance, on the political front, an Islamist society in principle does not give its citizens the right to change laws with popular majority, because they are destined by Quran and Sunnah. The Shura council is there only to advise and scrutinize the ruler and does not serve the purpose of legislation. The laws are considered divine and unchangeable.

One may argue that Erdogan has been fighting to make fundamental changes to the Constitution and this is what he has in mind i.e. Islamist legislation. This is untrue. The AKP lost its status as the majority party and the power to form a single-party government in 2015. It had this status, uninterrupted, for 13 years since it had come to power in 2002 and there were no attempts made to make “fundamental constitutional changes”.

However, reforming the Constitution was one of the main pledges of the AKP during the 2007 election campaign. With the majority seats in the parliament, AKP was able to secure a reform package on several issues. The catch is, not one of them was related to a more Islamic system of governance. The reform package included: the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman's office, the possibility to negotiate a nationwide labor contract, positive exceptions for female citizens, the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military, the right of civil servants to go on strike, a privacy law, and change in the structure of the Constitutional Court.

AKP does plan to rewrite the Constitution of Turkey, but not because of its Islamic stance, it is purely to make Erdogan a powerful president. It tries to pave the way for the disestablishment of the existing parliamentary system of government and its replacement by a presidential system.

On the economic front, capitalist principles like interest based banking, fiat currency; stock markets, indirect taxation and freedom of ownership are also discouraged in Islam. The Islamic model works on an interest free economy along with a taxation policy of Zakat, Khiraaj, Jizya etc. It does not allow state or public assets like energy, military, minerals etc. to be privatized. State lands are open for public to cultivate without any preconditions. AKP’s Turkey is a purely capitalist one from all perspectives and they have neither attempted to change it in 13 years of rule nor have they any plans to do so in the future.

The judicial structure of Islam has always been in the spotlight of western media because of jihadists claiming to implement them in their regions. Nonetheless, the judicial punishments derived from the Quran and Sunnah are well known. The Turkish Civil Law, on the other hand, has been modified by incorporating elements mainly of the Swiss Civil Code, the Code of Obligations and the German Commercial Code. The Administrative Law bears similarities with its French counterpart and the Penal Code with its Italian counterpart. In addition, Turkish law abolished the death penalty in all instances, including war time, which is a clear violation of Sharia law.

The conservative and secular nature of AKP and Erdogan can be witnessed on social issues. Considering them Islamist is a misconception. Allowing headscarf and limiting the age of alcohol drinking to 24 are the two main highlights of Erdogan’s so called Islamism.

In fact, it can be argued that he has allowed freedom of religious obligations by unbanning scarf or Hijab which is also a secular trait. Similarly banning alcohol for certain ages or certain times is again a matter of secular reasoning. For instance, drinking alcohol while driving is considered a criminal offence in most countries. Does that make the world Islamist? The basis of both these actions was not Sharia Law but conservative democracy. 

The question arises that for more than 13 years of ruling, have there been any attempts made in this regard? Erdoğan's close relations with Fethullah Gülen and his Cemaat Movement allowed his government to maintain a degree of influence within the judiciary through Gülen's supporters in high judicial and bureaucratic offices. He could have used this support to pursue Islamist motives in the Judiciary but he didn’t. On the contrary, when Gülen withdrew support from the AKP government in late 2013, a government corruption scandal broke out, leading to the arrest of several family members of cabinet ministers. Erdoğan accused Gülen of co-ordinating a "parallel state" within the judiciary in an attempt to topple him from power. He then removed or reassigned several judicial officials in an attempt to remove Gülen's supporters from office. Similarly, after the recent failed coup attempt, Erdoğan's 'purge' of several officers and judiciary is never seen by anyone as an attempt to remove the seculars from authority in order to implement Sharia. It is to punish those who tried to take power away from him.

Erdogan and AKP blamed the secular judiciary for revising the ban on headscarf as well as reducing the alcohol limit to 18 but didn’t take action to change that. But they did make changes when Erdogan was targeted with corruption scandals or coup attempt. This shows he can fight media, judiciary and public when it comes to his personal rule and his personal leadership, but not for Islamic rulings.

If one argues that Erdogan is moving towards an Islamist Turkey very slowly and cleverly, an answer to this can be given by Erdogan’s 2023 vision. The 2023 vision is a list of goals released by the administration of Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to coincide with the centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023. Not one of them includes pushing it towards Islamism.

The highlight of Erdogan’s Islamism comes from the Islamist publicity stunts which cannot be considered a significant practical step towards Islamization. But, it gets Islamists passionate towards him and the liberals /seculars worried.

In 2011, for instance, Erdoğan justified the removal of Statue of Humanity, a Turkish-Armenian friendship monument by stating that the monument was offensively close to the tomb of an 11th-century Islamic scholar, and that its shadow ruined the view of that site.

Moreover, Erdoğan has overseen a revival of Ottoman tradition, greeting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with an Ottoman-style ceremony in the new presidential palace, with guards dressed in costumes representing founders of 16 Great Turkish Empires in history. He also made references to the Ottoman era during election campaigns, such as calling their supporters 'grandsons of Ottomans'. He endorsed the old Ottoman term külliye to refer to university campuses rather than the Turkish word kampüs.

If a practical mind analyzes this, they can clearly see that these are nothing more than point scoring tactics with the public. These do not have any significant implications on the existing secular structure.

Another argument in favor of Erdogan’s Islamism can be regarding his anti-Semitic remarks and actions with Israel. In August 2014, during the Israel–Gaza conflict, Erdoğan accused Israel of deliberately killing Palestinian mothers, saying:

"They kill women so that they will not give birth to Palestinians; they kill babies so that they won't grow up; they kill men so they can't defend their country”.

On several other occasions, he has spoken against Israeli aggression and gained fame in the Muslim world.

On the other hand, there is serious cooperation between the two states which include Turkey being Israel's biggest trade partner in the region and its second-biggest in the world, besides the US. Other agreements include air, sea, land and intelligence cooperation, manufacturing of aircraft, armaments and missiles, mutual military visits, training and exercises, dispatch of observers to oversee military exercises, staff exchanges and military know-how.

Even in the flotilla incident, apart from the rhetoric, there were no practical steps taken and a verbal apology from Israel allowed him to shore up public support domestically and internationally.

Foreign policy in under Shariah is well known to propagate Islam and unite the Muslim world under one banner i.e. The Caliphate. Relations with belligerent states which are well known for killing innocent Muslims around the world cannot be exercised.

On the contrary, Turkey is a member of NATO and one of the main contributors of The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Incirlik air base has been providing military support to Americans for the war in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.

Turkey's role in the world was clearly outlined by Erdogan at an AKP party group meeting:

"Today Turkey is interested in most of the subjects in the world that the USA is interested in. We share a common vision in a very broad spectrum from Afghanistan to Iraq, Palestine, and Balkans. But most importantly we are in a concrete cooperation”.

Erdoğan has been criticized for his politicization of the media, especially after the 2013 protests. The opposing Republican People's Party (CHP) alleged that over 1,863 journalists lost their jobs due to their anti-government views in the 13 years of AKP rule. This was an attack on media because the media was maligning him on the 2013 corruption scandals. Erdogan can take a hit on media for his corruption scandals but cannot do the same to make it Islamist? Does that mean that there is no intention to make Media Islamist? I believe so.

There is another impression that there is serious opposition to Islamist ideas in Turkey and therefore Erdogan cannot do much. On the contrary, the fact that AKP has been ruling with a majority since 2002 is evidence of massive support for Islamist ideas amongst the masses.

Secondly, there had been only two significant protests in support of a more secular Turkey which have failed miserably. The first huge protest was on 14 April 2007, two days before the start of the nominations announcement for the presidential elections. Over one million protesters marched in the centre of Ankara, chanting slogans such as "Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular", and "We do not want an imam for President" to protest against the possibility of Prime Minister Erdoğan or another member of the Justice and Development Party standing in the presidential elections. But it could not stop AKP from bringing in their president.

The second protest, which is well known as the “Gezi movement protest” is wrongly termed as a protest for a secular Turkey. On 4 June, 2013 a solidarity group associated with the Occupy Gezi movement, Taksim Dayanısması ("Taksim Solidarity") issued several demands which included the preservation of Gezi Park, and end to violence. Not one of them was to stop Islamization or the likes.

The very recent coup attempt was thwarted by the Islamist public by coming out on roads and stopping the military officers from taking over. This means that it is a mere “myth” the Tukish masses will resist the process of Islamization. 

To conclude, the current Turkish model of governance has been praised by many Western politicians and secularists who believe the fusion of certain Islamic values with secularism is something the West can accept. Consequently, the Turkish model is nowhere near the Islamist model and it is really astonishing to see some Islamists praising Erdogan. This means that they are either misled by Erdegon’s fancy Islamist rhetoric or are themselves unclear as to what their demands are.

Can women be protected by a Bill?

This article has been published with some changes at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1096492/can-women-be-protected-by-a-bill/

Protection of Women Against Violence Bill has been hailed as a big achievement by many in the secular liberal circles while the religious circles are in serious opposition. The argument of the liberals is that it is empowerment of women and a step towards eliminating domestic violence. It will keep those husbands in control who treat their women as their subjects and consequently exercise different forms of violence against them. While the 35 religious parties APC condemned the law and said “This act ... is redundant and would add to the miseries of women.”

Domestic violence is a reality in Pakistan and it needs to be reckoned with. According to Aurat Foundation, “In 2013, more than 5,800 cases of violence against women were reported in Punjab”. A 2011 Thomson Reuters Foundation expert poll showed that domestic abuse, economic discrimination and acid attacks made Pakistan the world’s third most dangerous country for women. These are some serious statistics with which the religious group’s stance is quite frankly, ignorant.

But then, let us dig into the secular liberal stance; Make a law to criminalize it and let us hope everything will turn out to be fine, is absolutely immature. They seem to blindly imitate the west in such laws and fail to consider our unique societal dynamics. Moreover, one can also argue the credibility of such laws implemented in western world. According to data obtained from Health & Social Care Information Centre, Britain, the number of acid attacks on women in the last 10 years has doubled to 925. Every minute police in the UK receive a domestic assistance call and 2 women are killed every week in England and Wales by a partner. In a recent article on Nytimes, “Every year in France, 223,000 women are physically or psychologically abused by their partners”. In 2014 alone, 134 women died as a result of violence by their husbands or partners. Even though the western world has strict and intelligent laws on women protection related matters but these laws are not solving this social problem.

So what is going wrong?  An article on “The limits of Law” published at “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” discusses the effectiveness and limits of a Law in a deep intellectual sense. Laws might fail and the failure could be dramatic without understanding the society and human behavior. For instance, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., explained in a 1932 letter. “When Prohibition (alcohol consumption in US from 1920 to 1933) was introduced, I hoped that it would be widely supported by public opinion and the day would soon come when the evil effects of alcohol would be recognized. I have slowly and reluctantly come to believe that this has not been the result. Instead, drinking has generally increased; the speakeasy has replaced the saloon; a vast army of lawbreakers has appeared; many of our best citizens have openly ignored Prohibition; respect for the law has been greatly lessened; and crime has increased to a level never seen before.”

Knowing what works and what does not and what will be counterproductive is important knowledge. An article on “Law vs morality as regulators of conduct” by steven shavell of Harward law school presents an excellent perspective. He argues that a better sense of developing morality in many cases is the best manner of controlling a specific behavior pattern. For instance, morality and not Law is a means of control of much of our daily interactions and social discourse like fulfilling commitments or talking sensibly or treating guests or respecting the elderly etc. He rightly argues that establishing legal laws is not a very expensive process and does not take much time in being implemented. But the establishment of moral rules is extremely expensive and time consuming. Making a law to punish littering is easy but inculcating the moral rule that one should not litter requires constant effort over the years of childhood and social projects in elevating the values of a society.

Therefore, without understanding the social dynamics of a Pakistani household, the state will only make laws that fail miserably and are not practiced by the society at large. Pakistan’s family structure is strictly not individual and exhibits a family in the true sense. Therefore, in our society, the first priority is to resolve the issue within the husband and wife, but if it extends, the parents intervene and try to settle the disputes with utmost secrecy. They consider it a disgrace to discuss their family matters even with the ‘Khalas/chachus’ but where necessary, the elders intervene and try to resolve it. In such a climate of social bonding, interference and family dignity, a matter taken to the police is considered devastating for the family prestige. What consequences it can bring needs to be investigated before enacting laws.

Secondly, the issue of domestic violence is directly linked to the cultural upbringing of the males in the society which creates a male dominated society with high egos. Any sense of high feminist feature can create a backlash from the males in the family structure. The law that has a 24 hour helpline for women, women shelter homes, women being distanced from men using GPS etc. gives it a feminist color and comes in direct contradiction with a male’s ego. Problems are not solved by triggering the ego of another individual but by gradually changing the mindset. Moral awareness schemes, media, masjid sermons, education curriculum, etc on the basis of correct social values are fundamental in changing the mindset. 

Additionally, the style of discourse needs to change i.e. women are not a rare species which are being hunted down and need protection, let us consider women as companions living in a household setting with men, respectful home makers or professionals having an equal day to day contribution in any family’s life. They are as human as men and laws are same for them as they are for men. The current police structure should be formalized and educated in this regard rather than presenting a feminist style law could most probably backfire and increase the rise of separations and the rise of fatal violence.

We need to think deep about our societal dynamics to solve our problems and find ways which would work for us. Ignorance of problems or lack of an objective analysis are equally dangerous trends.

What can the IS offer Pakistani Militants

This article has been published with some changes at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1073889/can-offer-pakistani-militants/

In two words: nothing new. And this is exactly why its mass appeal and organised presence is very unlikely. Although I have always had serious reservations about the statements coming from the foreign ministry, I would side with them on this one. In order for a movement to be popular and organised, one needs to offer a unique aspect, either in terms of ideological appeal or material support. Coincidently, the IS scores zero on both counts when it comes to Pakistan.

Let us break this down a bit. As far as I understand, the IS wants to implement a strict form of Sharia law as a pan-Islamic caliphate; it wants to wipe out various sects; it labels those who do not support them as infidels; it encourages jihad against the West; it makes videos of brutal killings and beheadings and uses social media for propagation.

Those who are aware of the religious dynamics of Pakistan can very well see that all the points I mentioned about the IS are already present in Pakistan. Several organisations with such aims and objectives have been functional in Pakistan for well over a decade prior to the formation of the IS. In fact, the IS also has a serious disadvantage in that it is based thousands of miles away and thus, in no position to offer any kind of material support or create a consistent, reliable platform.

Another factor which the IS clearly lacks is that they split up with the main pan-Islamic militant movement, al Qaeda, which leads the jihadis of Pakistan and Afghanistan. After declaring their own caliph, they were not careful to denounce the widely-accepted jihadi Amir of the Afghan Taliban movement, Mullah Umar. Pakistan’s jihadi landscape is occupied by these two main streams i.e., the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. The third and most important militant organisation is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which operates solely in Pakistan and has a modus operandi similar to that of the IS, did not swear allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. There were some random defections towards the IS in Afghanistan, but as a whole, the TTP did not fall for IS. The TTP also released a detailed document denouncing the caliphate of Abu Bakr, on grounds that there is no consensus amongst the jihadi Muslim organisations on their Leadership.  Therefore, the extremely fertile jihadi grounds in Pakistan have already been occupied by the TTP, Taliban and al Qaeda. Then there are some state-sponsored jihadis like Jamatud-Dawa and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which fill in any gaps for additional jihadi urges. They are fully controlled and ready to be used for our foreign policy objectives in Kashmir, India and Afghanistan. Consequently, to enter these circles from thousands of miles away and expecting the existing jihadis to denounce their leaderships which nurtured them, is next to impossible.

Moreover, the IS considers various sects as infidels. Does that sound familiar? We already have our own version of the IS in the form of Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, who have demonstrated their capability to create havoc in society with exceptional resourcefulness and expertise. What else can the IS offer to people with sectarian leanings? I think it can easily be considered amateur in this business, when compared to those who have been in this profession for more than 25 years now.

If we talk about the ideological appeal that IS has to offer in the form of the idea of the caliphate and implementing Sharia, then there is still way too much and far more credible competition. Pakistan has a presence of ideological carriers of the idea of a caliphate in the form of organisations such as Tanzeem-e-Islami and Hizbut-Tahrir. These groups present a very modern image of a caliphate as compared to the IS image, which kills muslims and non-muslims alike. Tanzeem-e-Islami has a presence from the 1990s and has been propagating a non-violent method of establishing a caliphate in the country. Hizbut-Tahrir has been chanting the slogan of a caliphate from 1950s, after its formation in Palestine. It presents itself as a pan-Islamic movement, has a deep ideological appeal, is non-militant, has a strong presence on social media and has been advocating the idea in Pakistan from the early 2000s. Both of these organisations have categorically rejected the IS caliphate and its tactics and have, therefore, side-lined this aspect of IS ideological appeal within the country.

Therefore, when people say Pakistan has a fertile ground for the IS to propagate, I would consider it a superficial argument at best. The correct argument would be that Pakistan has a fertile ground for the political idea of a caliphate/Sharia law, the support for militant jihad and support for militancy against sects. But all three notions are locally occupied. Moreover, the seat bearers have also openly rejected to entertain a member who has nothing new to offer in terms of resources or ideas.