This article has been published with some changes at
http://nation.com.pk/blogs/27-Aug-2016/contrary-to-popular-opinion-erdogan-is-not-an-islamist
The Turkish president is not
against secularism, but assertive secularism in Turkey
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the powerful ruler of Turkey, is considered an Islamist by many. Evidences to support this perception include his explicit use of Islamist jargon in his speeches, his past as an Islamist activist, his wife wearing a scarf, his reaction on the Gaza issue, his attempt to introduce some form of ban on alcohol. On the contrary, however, it can also be argued that Mr. Erdegon is a politician who understands how Islamist rhetoric or seemingly Islamist actions can be used to garner mass public support. At the same time, he knows how Islamist ideas must be sidelined to ensure the status quo and the secular nature of Turkey.
To make a factual analysis on the Erdogan Turkish model and its ideological leanings, an understanding of the difference between an Islamist model and a secular model is necessary. In fact, a further classification of the secular model into a soft/conservative secular model i.e. British/Canadian model and a hard secular model i.e. Kamal Ataturk/French model might be required.
An Islamist model considers the Muslim Ummah its citizens and is mostly anti-national with an expansionist foreign policy; Sharia law rather than man-made laws are the basis of its social, economic, judicial, educational and political systems. Minorities are given rights to follow their own religion but they are also bound by Sharia law in matters of economics, judiciary, social, education and political systems.
Keeping this perspective in mind, we see that AKP has no intentions to make Turkey an Islamist model because in several speeches made in 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan clearly stated:
"We are not an Islamic party, and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat."
Former minister Hüseyin Çelik said:
"The AK Party is a conservative democratic party. The AK Party's conservatism is limited to moral and social issues."
This was also echoed by Erdoğan that AK Party's agenda is limited to "Conservative democracy" and he recommended secularism for Egypt when the Islamist party Ikhwan came to power.
If we extend the AK party’s conservatism, it seems that they are discussing political conservatism based on moral and social values derived from Islam. There are several political parties in Europe, America and elsewhere in the world who stand for religious conservative principles in their politics. Conservative values are grounded in religious beliefs and principally seek to apply the teachings of their particular religion on politics and society, sometimes by merely proclaiming the value of those teachings, at other times by having those teachings influence laws. Religious conservatism typically opposes abortion, homosexuality, drug use, and premarital sex.
The important point however is these parties are secular in nature and not Christian or Islamist. They firmly believe that any change in the fabric of society is the sole authority of the people and their course of action for any change in law is through the will of the people i.e. Democracy.
AKP upholds its secular identity by limiting its religious conservatism to social aspects only which would rarely jump into matters related to economic, judicial, political and foreign affairs. The Turkish government announced in a statement that AKP had abandoned plans to join the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and has instead joined on 12th November, 2013, the European Conservatives and Reformists political family. This announcement further confirms the secular nature of AKP but this secularism is of a soft/conservative nature.
An Islamist outlook is however different from the religious conservative outlook. An Islamist considers Islam and the Holy Quran as the sole derivative of the state's constitution.
For instance, on the political front, an Islamist society in principle does not give its citizens the right to change laws with popular majority, because they are destined by Quran and Sunnah. The Shura council is there only to advise and scrutinize the ruler and does not serve the purpose of legislation. The laws are considered divine and unchangeable.
One may argue that Erdogan has been fighting to make fundamental changes to the Constitution and this is what he has in mind i.e. Islamist legislation. This is untrue. The AKP lost its status as the majority party and the power to form a single-party government in 2015. It had this status, uninterrupted, for 13 years since it had come to power in 2002 and there were no attempts made to make “fundamental constitutional changes”.
However, reforming the Constitution was one of the main pledges of the AKP during the 2007 election campaign. With the majority seats in the parliament, AKP was able to secure a reform package on several issues. The catch is, not one of them was related to a more Islamic system of governance. The reform package included: the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman's office, the possibility to negotiate a nationwide labor contract, positive exceptions for female citizens, the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military, the right of civil servants to go on strike, a privacy law, and change in the structure of the Constitutional Court.
AKP does plan to rewrite the Constitution of Turkey, but not because of its Islamic stance, it is purely to make Erdogan a powerful president. It tries to pave the way for the disestablishment of the existing parliamentary system of government and its replacement by a presidential system.
On the economic front, capitalist principles like interest based banking, fiat currency; stock markets, indirect taxation and freedom of ownership are also discouraged in Islam. The Islamic model works on an interest free economy along with a taxation policy of Zakat, Khiraaj, Jizya etc. It does not allow state or public assets like energy, military, minerals etc. to be privatized. State lands are open for public to cultivate without any preconditions. AKP’s Turkey is a purely capitalist one from all perspectives and they have neither attempted to change it in 13 years of rule nor have they any plans to do so in the future.
The judicial structure of Islam has always been in the spotlight of western media because of jihadists claiming to implement them in their regions. Nonetheless, the judicial punishments derived from the Quran and Sunnah are well known. The Turkish Civil Law, on the other hand, has been modified by incorporating elements mainly of the Swiss Civil Code, the Code of Obligations and the German Commercial Code. The Administrative Law bears similarities with its French counterpart and the Penal Code with its Italian counterpart. In addition, Turkish law abolished the death penalty in all instances, including war time, which is a clear violation of Sharia law.
The conservative and secular nature of AKP and Erdogan can be witnessed on social issues. Considering them Islamist is a misconception. Allowing headscarf and limiting the age of alcohol drinking to 24 are the two main highlights of Erdogan’s so called Islamism.
In fact, it can be argued that he has allowed freedom of religious obligations by unbanning scarf or Hijab which is also a secular trait. Similarly banning alcohol for certain ages or certain times is again a matter of secular reasoning. For instance, drinking alcohol while driving is considered a criminal offence in most countries. Does that make the world Islamist? The basis of both these actions was not Sharia Law but conservative democracy.
The question arises that for more than 13 years of ruling, have there been any attempts made in this regard? Erdoğan's close relations with Fethullah Gülen and his Cemaat Movement allowed his government to maintain a degree of influence within the judiciary through Gülen's supporters in high judicial and bureaucratic offices. He could have used this support to pursue Islamist motives in the Judiciary but he didn’t. On the contrary, when Gülen withdrew support from the AKP government in late 2013, a government corruption scandal broke out, leading to the arrest of several family members of cabinet ministers. Erdoğan accused Gülen of co-ordinating a "parallel state" within the judiciary in an attempt to topple him from power. He then removed or reassigned several judicial officials in an attempt to remove Gülen's supporters from office. Similarly, after the recent failed coup attempt, Erdoğan's 'purge' of several officers and judiciary is never seen by anyone as an attempt to remove the seculars from authority in order to implement Sharia. It is to punish those who tried to take power away from him.
Erdogan and AKP blamed the secular judiciary for revising the ban on headscarf as well as reducing the alcohol limit to 18 but didn’t take action to change that. But they did make changes when Erdogan was targeted with corruption scandals or coup attempt. This shows he can fight media, judiciary and public when it comes to his personal rule and his personal leadership, but not for Islamic rulings.
If one argues that Erdogan is moving towards an Islamist Turkey very slowly and cleverly, an answer to this can be given by Erdogan’s 2023 vision. The 2023 vision is a list of goals released by the administration of Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to coincide with the centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023. Not one of them includes pushing it towards Islamism.
The highlight of Erdogan’s Islamism comes from the Islamist publicity stunts which cannot be considered a significant practical step towards Islamization. But, it gets Islamists passionate towards him and the liberals /seculars worried.
In 2011, for instance, Erdoğan justified the removal of Statue of Humanity, a Turkish-Armenian friendship monument by stating that the monument was offensively close to the tomb of an 11th-century Islamic scholar, and that its shadow ruined the view of that site.
Moreover, Erdoğan has overseen a revival of Ottoman tradition, greeting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with an Ottoman-style ceremony in the new presidential palace, with guards dressed in costumes representing founders of 16 Great Turkish Empires in history. He also made references to the Ottoman era during election campaigns, such as calling their supporters 'grandsons of Ottomans'. He endorsed the old Ottoman term külliye to refer to university campuses rather than the Turkish word kampüs.
If a practical mind analyzes this, they can clearly see that these are nothing more than point scoring tactics with the public. These do not have any significant implications on the existing secular structure.
Another argument in favor of Erdogan’s Islamism can be regarding his anti-Semitic remarks and actions with Israel. In August 2014, during the Israel–Gaza conflict, Erdoğan accused Israel of deliberately killing Palestinian mothers, saying:
"They kill women so that they will not give birth to Palestinians; they kill babies so that they won't grow up; they kill men so they can't defend their country”.
On several other occasions, he has spoken against Israeli aggression and gained fame in the Muslim world.
On the other hand, there is serious cooperation between the two states which include Turkey being Israel's biggest trade partner in the region and its second-biggest in the world, besides the US. Other agreements include air, sea, land and intelligence cooperation, manufacturing of aircraft, armaments and missiles, mutual military visits, training and exercises, dispatch of observers to oversee military exercises, staff exchanges and military know-how.
Even in the flotilla incident, apart from the rhetoric, there were no practical steps taken and a verbal apology from Israel allowed him to shore up public support domestically and internationally.
Foreign policy in under Shariah is well known to propagate Islam and unite the Muslim world under one banner i.e. The Caliphate. Relations with belligerent states which are well known for killing innocent Muslims around the world cannot be exercised.
On the contrary, Turkey is a member of NATO and one of the main contributors of The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Incirlik air base has been providing military support to Americans for the war in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.
Turkey's role in the world was clearly outlined by Erdogan at an AKP party group meeting:
"Today Turkey is interested in most of the subjects in the world that the USA is interested in. We share a common vision in a very broad spectrum from Afghanistan to Iraq, Palestine, and Balkans. But most importantly we are in a concrete cooperation”.
Erdoğan has been criticized for his politicization of the media, especially after the 2013 protests. The opposing Republican People's Party (CHP) alleged that over 1,863 journalists lost their jobs due to their anti-government views in the 13 years of AKP rule. This was an attack on media because the media was maligning him on the 2013 corruption scandals. Erdogan can take a hit on media for his corruption scandals but cannot do the same to make it Islamist? Does that mean that there is no intention to make Media Islamist? I believe so.
There is another impression that there is serious opposition to Islamist ideas in Turkey and therefore Erdogan cannot do much. On the contrary, the fact that AKP has been ruling with a majority since 2002 is evidence of massive support for Islamist ideas amongst the masses.
Secondly, there had been only two significant protests in support of a more secular Turkey which have failed miserably. The first huge protest was on 14 April 2007, two days before the start of the nominations announcement for the presidential elections. Over one million protesters marched in the centre of Ankara, chanting slogans such as "Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular", and "We do not want an imam for President" to protest against the possibility of Prime Minister Erdoğan or another member of the Justice and Development Party standing in the presidential elections. But it could not stop AKP from bringing in their president.
The second protest, which is well known as the “Gezi movement protest” is wrongly termed as a protest for a secular Turkey. On 4 June, 2013 a solidarity group associated with the Occupy Gezi movement, Taksim Dayanısması ("Taksim Solidarity") issued several demands which included the preservation of Gezi Park, and end to violence. Not one of them was to stop Islamization or the likes.
The very recent coup attempt was thwarted by the Islamist public by coming out on roads and stopping the military officers from taking over. This means that it is a mere “myth” the Tukish masses will resist the process of Islamization.
To conclude, the current Turkish model of governance has been praised by many Western politicians and secularists who believe the fusion of certain Islamic values with secularism is something the West can accept. Consequently, the Turkish model is nowhere near the Islamist model and it is really astonishing to see some Islamists praising Erdogan. This means that they are either misled by Erdegon’s fancy Islamist rhetoric or are themselves unclear as to what their demands are.
